"Overcome your anger if you are a man": Silencing women's agency to voice violence against women by Akyüz S. & Sayan-Cengiz F.
Women's Studies International Forum 57 (2016) 1–10
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Women's Studies International Forum
j ourna l homepage: www.e lsev ie r .com/ locate /ws i f“Overcome your anger if you are a man”: Silencing women's
agency to voice violence against womenSelin Akyüz a,⁎, Feyda Sayan-Cengiz b
a Bilkent University, İhsan Dogramaci International Advanced Studies Centre, Ankara, Turkey
b İstanbul Bilgi University Faculty of Communication, Department of Media, İstanbul, Turkeya r t i c l e i n f o⁎ Corresponding author.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2016.03.004
0277-5395/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.s y n o p s i sAvailable online 4 May 2016 This study traces the relation betweenmale violence andmasculinist norms that attribute political
agency exclusively to men. Through critical analysis of a recent campaign initiated as an effort to
fight violence against women in Turkey by addressing men as the only agents endowed with
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A short film opens with a man leaving his house in the
morning. He is shaven and wears a clean, smart suit. He starts
walking in his neighborhood, smiling, and greeting people all
around. Apparently, everyone knows him, but there is an air of
uneasiness: a gardener and elderly neighbors refuse to greet
him, giving him accusing glances. Even little boys give him the
cold shoulder. Then an authoritative, almost angry male
narrates: “Did you think that we would take you for a man?”
At that moment, the camera pans to the man's house from the
outside. From between the curtains, there is a mere shadow of
him hitting a woman, presumably his wife. The short film
concludes with the voiceover, almost to the point of shouting:
“Those who hit women are not men! Be a man first!”
The short film is part of a campaign in Turkey to battle male
violence against women. The slogan, “Be a man first,” is the
follow-up to a 2013-slogan of “Overcome your anger if you are
a man.” The campaign is organized by KADEM (Women andDemocracy Association), a relatively new woman's organiza-
tion. As a conservative association, KADEM's vision is “con-
serving the essential values of women in Turkey.”1 The short
film contains strikingmoments that conveymessages similar to
the slogans of the campaign. In step with the slogans
addressing only men, there are no women among the “people
of the neighborhood”; even the kids are boys playing football:
Themessage conveyed in the film is all aboutmen,men beating
their wives, and other men giving them the cold shoulder,
through symbolic gestures of disapproval. Apparently, violence
is a secret that is disapproved of and that “everyone knows but
no one (in the neighborhood) talks about.” The audience only
sees violence through the curtains of the home:whilewatching
the shadows, the spectator is made to feel like an intruder into
the sanctity of the “private space.” Even more interesting is the
fact that the battered wife does not even have a body: she is a
mere shadow reflected on the wall of her home. She has no
voice.
Violence against women is a major human rights
issue. According to a study conducted by the World Health
Organization (WHO), 35 % of women around the world
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their lives.2 Among themost pervasive types of violence against
women is intimate partner violence, which damages a
woman's physical, psychological, sexual, and social integrity.
In Turkey, the numbers are by no means better than the world
average. According to the latest national research carried out by
Turkey's Directorate General on the Status ofWomen (DGSW),
“39.3% ofwomen reported having experiencedphysical partner
violence, 14.3% of them reported sexual violence, 43.9%
emotional violence, 23.4% economic violence at any time in
their life” (Güvenç et al., 2014: 334). According to the data
recorded by Bianet, an online communication network follow-
ing cases ofmale violence in national, local, and internetmedia,
in 2014, at least 281 women were killed by men while 190
women were raped and 140 women were sexually abused.3
Despite positive developments in the legal framework, such as
the adoption of a new domestic violence law, namely Law no
6248,4 violence against women has not decelerated its
increasing trend. Although amendments to the country's
Penal Code hinted at political gains by recognizing
government's responsibility for providing shelter to victims of
domestic violence, notmuchprogress has beenmade. In power
since 2002, JDP (Justice and Development Party) government
evinced the party's anti-feminist stance by advocating “a
neoliberal conservative version of patriarchy” marking “the
familial sphere as the natural locus of women” (Coşar and
Yeğenoğlu, 2011: 567). Within the neoliberal restructuring of
the country, the JDP's family focused policies as well as
discussions concerning women's bodies and reproductive
functions have reaffirmed that Turkish women's bodies have
become a battleground for political actors. Instances of
discussion include government attempts to ban abortion,
emphasis on motherhood as “the central career for women,”
and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's (former JDP leader and
PrimeMinister) “advice” for bearing at least three kids (Onar &
Müftüler-Baç, 2011; Ünal & Cindoğlu, 2013). Such a formula-
tion packs the patriarchal view of the government aligning
with an anti-feminist agenda by not recognizing women's
autonomy. This is the backdrop that should be considered
when analyzing KADEM's “Overcome your anger if you are a
man!” campaign.
KADEM was founded in 2013, with the mission of
“formulating common public awareness in society in terms of
women's rights and equal opportunities with the family and in
social roles.”5 In this way, the organization has aligned itself
with the government's conservative position by situating the
woman within the boundaries of the family. In addition, their
vision of “preserving the Turkish women's essence while
elevating her to a compatible position with women all around
theworld in national and international platforms”6 emphasizes
cultural essence and hints at the idea of conserving traditional
gender roles.
In declarations regarding their campaign, KADEM officials
emphasize that they aim to address men and give them the
central role in seeking solutions to the problem. Indeed, this
objective at first seems compatible with global trends in the
struggle against male violence: there are several campaigns
and programs conducted by governments and civil society
organizations to engage men in this struggle “as participants in
education programs, as targets of social marketing campaigns,
as policy makers and gatekeepers, and as activists andadvocates” (Flood, 2011: 358). Scholarship exploring the
relationship between masculinity and violence discusses how
to mobilize men against male violence without losing critical
perspectives on masculinist norms and patriarchal relations of
domination (Seymour, 2011; Greig, 2001). Analyzing the
KADEM campaign and its slogan “Overcome your anger if you
are a man” is particularly of significance for this discussion as it
lays bare the risks of abandoning the critical perspective on
masculinities in the name of addressing and engaging men. In
this paper, we delineate the ways in which the campaign
becomes counterproductive by normalizing masculinist norms
and patriarchal relations of domination, even to the point of
reserving the agency to deal with the issue exclusively to men
and excluding women from the struggle. While the campaign
calls men to simply “be men” in an effort to fight violence
against women, it bears the danger of ossifying and reinforcing
patterns of male domination as it avoids a critical questioning
of the connotations attributed to “being a man.”
This article discusses the campaign's three interconnected
lines of argumentation which form the discursive ground on
which the slogan “Overcome your anger if you are amen” rests.
The first pillar is the emphasis on “cultural particularity” and
the centrality of the traditional family structure in Turkey. The
second pillar is the argument that men and only men are the
agents who will solve the issue of violence and that a relevant
campaign should avoid conflicting with social codes of
masculinity and stay on “men's good side” in a bid to convince
them to stop being violent. The third pillar relies on the
argument that male violence is a “personal,” “individual” issue
of anger management, therefore solutions to this problem are
at the individual level. All in all, this discursive ground diverts
attention from the problem of patriarchy and promotes a view
of male violence stripped from patriarchal relations of power
and domination.Drawing theoretical boundaries: Revisiting normalized
gender hierarchies
Before analyzing the campaign in detail, this section draws
theoretical boundaries that the analysis is based on. It is
significant to revisit themale-centered political domainwith its
embedded discourses and meanings as it offers the ways in
which normative masculine domination is reproduced. This
study employs the conceptual framework of critical masculin-
ity studies to understand the reproduction of normative
masculine domination and its role in breeding male violence.
We argue that in order to understand the reproduction of
masculine domination, it is essential to explore, first, the
relational construction of a gender order, in other words “how
masculinities and femininities are produced together in the
process that constitutes a gender order” (Connell, 1995: 72),
and second, to analyze this relational construct within the
specific historical, social, and political context it is produced.
Scholars of gender studies have problematized male
violence as the most visible form of masculine domination.7
Considering that “interpersonal violence is about power and
the negotiation of power relations and it is also organised along
gender boundaries” (McCarry, 2007: 412), it is vital to
understand unequal gender hierarchy and the gender order it
generates as the context that breeds male violence. AsMcCarry
3S. Akyüz, F. Sayan-Cengiz / Women's Studies International Forum 57 (2016) 1–10puts it, “the literature on men and masculinity would be an
obvious starting point” (2007: 412).
Connell (2002) underlines the significance of analyzing the
historical, institutional, and discursive contexts in which both
the gendered power hierarchy and an unequal gender order are
reproduced. It is this order that students of gender aim to
critically analyze. Embracing this perspective, our critical
analysis of the KADEM campaign is embedded in an analysis
of historically, socially, and politically constructed gendered
norms in contemporary Turkey. Within this context, what
meanings does the campaign generate?Which discourses does
it tap into? What norms of masculinity and femininity are
encouraged? Which possibilities and which struggles are
pushed to the margins through campaign's discourse?
With the revival of the feministmovement, “varied theories
developed to explain the causes of male domination, to
correct erroneous assumptions about both women and men,
and to imagine new kinds of men and of women in new
circumstances” (Kegan Gardiner, 2005: 36). Men and mascu-
linity studies have been contributing to this theoretical terrain
since the late 1970s. Initially, researchers and scholars of men
and masculinities aimed to broaden the historically myopic
perspective of gender scholars who conflated gender studies
withwomen's studies. The prominent terms of the firstwave of
masculinity studies, in the 1970s, simply revolved around a
discussion on restrictions, disadvantages, and general penalties
attached to being a man (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005;
Kimmel, Hearn, & Connell, 2005). This early wave of masculin-
ity studies questioned how the system has victimized men, or
in other words, how men have been oppressed by the gender
roles attributed to them. This was followed by a shift of focus to
the notion of “masculinities” in the late 1980s. Scholars have
tended to agree that there is a need to think of masculinity not
as a singular sex role but as multiple, contextual constructions.
Connell introduced the concept of hegemonic masculinity
which in turn raised the discussion about different forms of
masculinity. For Connell, hegemonic masculinity is constructed
in relation to various subordinated masculinities as well as in
relation to women (Connell, 1987: 183). Accordingly, hege-
monicmasculinity not only graspsmen's patriarchal dominance
over women but also hegemony of some masculinities over
others, highlighting hierarchical classifications of masculinities
(Connell, 1987, 1990). While pointing out the processes
that create hegemony, subordination, complicity, and margin-
alization among masculinities (Connell, 2005), Connell also
emphasizes how models of emphasized femininity are crucial,
as “patterns of masculinity are socially defined in contradistinc-
tion from some model (whether real or imaginary) form of
femininity” (Connell, 2005: 848).
The critical studies of men andmasculinities, in general, the
concept of hegemonic masculinity, in particular, provided
researchers with new possibilities to re-visit gender analyses
of states, systems, cultures, ideologies, and violence. It is
through this conceptual framework that this study explores
the processes in which the relational constructions of
masculinities and femininities shapes political discourses that
exclude women from the public political realm and devoid
them of political agency even in the struggle against male
violence which directly concerns their bodies and livelihoods.
McCormack's (2007:1) pertinent question of “why have
men traditionally been associated with the public politicaldomain and what implications (does) this have for gender
relations as a whole?” recognizes that it is not only conceptu-
alizations of femininity but those of masculinity which are
actively created and fostered through processes of inculcating
common values and behaviors, constructing power relation-
ships, or negotiating the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion.
Thereby, it is critical to revisit how perceived dichotomies are
gendered and the implications of these dichotomies for gender
relations. Especially, in the framework of negotiating/drawing
the boundaries of exclusion and inclusion that has resulted in
the dichotomized replacements of men and women into
different spheres, it is important to analyze gendered consen-
sual norms. As the literature on gendered distinction between
public and private realms argues, political discourse has been
shaped by constituting femininity as “the other” (Pitkin, 1984;
Pateman, 1988; Kann, 1998). This discourse is “male centered,
as if men were doing what came naturally when they
presumed to monopolize power and ignore women's potential
or presence as public persons” (Kann, 1998: 18). Since ancient
Greece, theorists have “associated manhood with wisdom,
virtue and citizenship but tied womanhood to dangerous,
disorderly and irrational forces” and thereby shaped the main
contours of the gendered boundaries (Hartsock, 1983 cited in
Kann, 1998: 16). In Bourdieuian terms, this “honorific award of
culture” has naturalized and normalized gender hierarchies
(Bourdieu, 2001). Along the same lines, for Brittan, the
naturalization of male power has relatively remained constant
and, attributing some aspects of men's behaviors, such as
aggression and insensitivity, were “based on the idea that there
is something aboutmenwhich transcends their local situation.”
(1989:4). Similarly, Hawkesworth argues that gender symbol-
ism, generating a logic in which rationality, competence, and
leadership are coded as masculine, is embedded in “(…)
structures of belief that constitute the identities and aspirations
of gendered political agents” (2005: 150). That is how the
masculine has become normal and also normative as political
institutions, discourses, and agents have traditionally been
guided by a discourse of objective reasoning and rationality.
Women with their traditional supporting roles remain outside
this “traditional remit” of the political sphere (Hooper, 2001:
92). Consequently, gendered hierarchies are reproduced and
patterns of male authority are legitimized through the
domination of “a grammar of manhood”(Kann, 1998:3). This
dominant “grammar of manhood” that is employed by the
political elites to stabilize political authority is encapsulated by
a “culture of manhood” (Connell, 2005). This “culture of
manhood” consistently naturalizes the superiority ofmasculine
characteristics. Following this conceptualization, this study
specifically defines political masculinities within the multi-
layered network of politics. In line with Starck and Sauer's
definition of political masculinities, our definition embodies
“any kind of masculinity traits that is constructed around,
ascribed to and/or claimed by political players” (2014: 6,
emphasis ours).
To put it more bluntly, in this study, we take the political
domain as a network which is not limited to political
institutions or the political elite, but which encapsulates the
discursive realm in which certain agents are almost “naturally”
ascribed political agency, while others are excluded. As the
masculinity literature suggests, these processes of exclusion
and inclusion are highly gendered and have their basis in the
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socially created and symbolically idealized masculinities, the
reproduction of hegemonic norms found the fertile ground to
flourish with the help of the political agents.
Gendered metaphors: Carriers of the culture of manhood
In order to trace the root of these conventional social
discourses that reproduce hegemonic masculine norms, it is
useful to look into the gendered metaphors that are widely
used in Turkey's political realm. Parpart and Zalewski claim
that “(…) metaphors act as motors of discourse which work to
frame and naturalize masculinist assumptions.” (2008: 10).
Similarly, Bora and Tol (2009) draw attention to the defining
metaphors which figure as “motors of discourse” in naturaliz-
ing the construction of Turkish politics as a masculine realm.
The most common example is the metaphor of er meydanı
(arena of man) to describe the field of Turkish politics as an
“arena” where men display their power and “manliness.” It is
very common among Turkish political leaders to “invite” their
opponents to er meydanı for a test of manliness and strength.
The metaphor is especially interesting as it refers to the arena
(er meydanı) where the traditional, ancestral, and exclusively
masculine sport of oil wrestling takes place. This sport is
especially renowned for the annual Kırkpınar tournaments that
attract tourists to Edirne, a city in western Turkey. In these
tournaments, the most successful oil-wrestlers engage in
competitions, publicly displaying their muscular andoiled
bodies. It is practically a show where the male body and its
power are glorified, celebrated, and rewarded. More impor-
tantly, er meydanı, where oil wrestling takes place, is a strictly
virile field, “defined” by the exclusion of the female.
It is indeed interesting that a metaphor which loads politics
with such exclusively and extremely masculine connotations
has been normalized in the political rhetoric in Turkey.
Whereas political leaders “invite” their opponents to er
meydanı, this invitation never remains ignored by other
politicians. The metaphorical confrontations continue through
invitations to “tests of courage” in which men, the main actors
of politics, should displaymanly bravery instead of being fragile
or sensitive “like women”.
Bora and Tol (2009) also argue that the masculinist
necessity manifests itself in the male body as the main agent
within the field of politics, meaning that the metaphors
reinforcing dominant norms of hegemonic masculinity are
undergirded by the assumption that every political actor is
male. Whereas Bora and Tol highlight the politicians involved
in institutional politics, it is possible to argue that the main
interlocutors and addressees of this masculinist political
discourse are also assumed to be men. In line with the
argument that deep-rooted symbolic associations construct
man as the natural holders of power (Yanagisako & Delaney,
1994: 3), the symbolic idealizations in Turkish political
discourse reserve political agency to men as well. Whereas
men are situated as the main political agents, women are
excluded fromholding political agency. In addition to the use of
gendered metaphor of er meydani, there are other gendered
expressions that define the parameters for a decent person
such as adam gibi or erkek gibi (both meaning “like a man”).
These are commonly used examples of the language of
manhood. They define a set of norms, i.e. toughness, integrity,appositeness, and expect “men and/or individual” to behave
accordingly. In this framework, it can be argued that Turkish
politics as a field has never been estranged from gendered
images.
“Shout out”: Calling women to fight against male violence
In this section, we explore the ways in which women's
movements in Turkey have handled the gendered hierarchies
and norms that assume men as the natural political agents
while pushing women to an eternal position of silence and
“otherness.” We especially look into the ways the post-1980
women's movement came up with to challenge these norms
and suggest that the struggle against male violence has given
this movement its primarymomentum in terms of establishing
women's activism as an autonomous actor in the stage of
political life.
Turkey's early republican history is permeated with para-
doxes regarding the “women question.” Even though the
modernization process in the early Republican period dramat-
ically changed women's lives by integrating them in public and
political life, the gender politics of this era have largely been
scrutinized for repressing women's autonomous organization
(Tekeli, 1986; Zihnioğlu, 2003) and bringing about a transfor-
mation that does not challenge the patriarchal limits in the
realm of political life (Arat, 1989; Berktay, 2001; Kandiyoti,
1987). The trajectory of the women's movements in Turkey
demonstrates different paths through which women have
responded to these patriarchal limits. In attempts to periodize
the women's movement in Republican Turkey, the most
significant distinction is drawn between Kemalist women's
activism and the feminist movement that emerged in the post-
1980 period (Arat, 1999; Coşar & Yeğenoğlu, 2011; Sirman,
1989). The pre-1980 era women's movement is defined either
by the Kemalist-oriented women's organizations, which
remained within the limits of “state feminism” (Tekeli, 1986:
193) or leftist orientedwomen's organizations that framed their
demands within the limits drawn by the socialist movement
(Özçürümez & Sayan-Cengiz, 2011; Tekeli, 1986). In other
words, it has been argued that there were shortcomings in
terms of developing autonomous feminist demands and
defining women's issues as politically significant issues in their
own right (Akal, 1996; Tekeli, 1990). The post-1980 feminist
movement, on the other hand, not only detached itself from
other (Kemalist or socialist) ideological frames but also critically
examined the way those frames silenced women's autonomy
and political agency (Tekeli, 1986, 1990).
Building on the argument that the post-1980 feminist
movement struggled toward establishing women as autono-
mous actors in public and political life, we suggest that the
feminist struggle against male violence enabled posing a
challenge to masculinist political discourse mainly in two
ways: First, by asserting that male violence in the domestic
realm is a structural thus political problem, it complicates the
dichotomy of “public vs. private/personal” and challenges the
idea that “domestic” violence is a problem to be relegated to the
“private/personal” realm. Second, by addressing women as
political agents who will seek solutions to this deeply rooted
problem through solidarity and struggle.
The women's movement in the post-1980 era in Turkey
started with grassroots activism in the form of small
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feminist discourse and emboldenedwomen's solidarity against
structural patriarchy deeply rooted in various walks of political
and social life. Perhaps the most crucial contribution of these
groups was to help women find their “voice”8 through sharing
their experiences of being subjugated. It was through the
sharing of experiences that an awareness of how the
established masculinist norms at the public and political level
and at the level of intimate relations interpenetrate and
reproduce each other.
The post-1980 feminist movement gained nationwide
recognition and publicity through the Campaign against the
Battering ofWomen, and theWomen'sMarch Against Violence
in 1987whichwas the firstmassive street demonstration of the
post-coup era. Moreover, this march marked the first time
“women took to the streets themselves, for their own
problems, with an organization of their own” (Savran cited in
Altınay & Arat, 2008: 18). Sirman notes that the Campaign
against the Battering ofWomen “served as a focus point around
which different (feminist) groups have rallied and co-
operated” (1989:7). The Women's March against Violence
and the followingmeetings, festivals, and publications not only
provided the movement with recognition and publicity in the
national media but also started the process of “naming”
violence against women as a public and political issue. In
1988, following the Campaign against the Battering ofWomen,
feminist women published a book titled “Shout and be Heard,”
which consisted of the experiences of battered women. The
book further called women to voice their experiences of being
subjected to male violence and to bring those experiences to
public attention without being ashamed or intimidated. The
main objective of the bookwas tomake the point thatwhat had
been categorized as a “personal” issue is in fact a common
experience of structural oppression in women's lives, which
can be overcomeonly by the solidarity ofwomen. This notion is
captured in the following statement in the book: “Personal is
political… We need to expose that the issues presented as
personal problems are actually the common problems of an
oppressed group.”9 In otherwords,womenwere called to voice
male violence rather than cover it up under the “sanctity” of the
family. It was also an empowering call because women were
addressed as “thepolitical agents”whowould bring the issue to
the public realm of discussion.
The current struggle against male violence has a history
steeped in the history of Turkey not limited to the early 1980's
activism. A detailed account of this history is beyond the scope
of this paper.10 Yet, the discourse of women's solidarity against
structural patriarchy interpenetrating the level of intimate
relations aswell as public and political levels had its seeds sown
during the post-1980s feminist activism. It is this discourse that
acted as a lever to carve out a space for autonomous women's
activism.
The discourse of the post-1980 feminist movement in
Turkey resonates with second wave feminism, especially with
regard to bringing “the personal” within the realm of
“the political,” hence extending the boundaries of the latter.
In other words, vital issues such as male violence and sexual
harassment, which had been formerly relegated to the
“personal” realm, were “named” and brought to public
attention as structural problems stemming from the
established gender ideology and deeply rooted patriarchy.The novelty of second wave feminism lies in the exploration of
male oppression in the “personal” realm, such as the family and
everyday life experiences of women (Bryson, 1992). Indeed, it
is possible to suggest that this is exactly what constituted the
fundamental challenge presented by the post-1980 movement
in Turkey, and further, that making the male violence in the
domestic realm visible was the foremost component of this
challenge.
To put it in a nutshell, the women's struggle against male
violence figured as a defining struggle in thepost-1980 feminist
movement's challenge against dominant codes of masculinity
that define men as “the natural players” of the political field,
entitled to determine its borders. The post-1980 women's
movement claimed to redefine the borders of the political by
pointing out how the violence pervading intimate relations is
embedded in the structural, gendered relations of domination
that permeate social and political fields. This process goes hand
in hand with exposing the connection between male violence
against women and the established masculinist norms that
assign men the tasks of being powerful, potent, and authori-
tative. Consequently, the movement defined women as
political agents who would carry out a political struggle in
solidaritywith each other. Through definingwomen as political
agents who would speak out about the violence in the
household, the movement challenged the model of
hegemonicmodels of silent, docile femininity that are con-
structed in relation to the norms of hegemonic masculinity.
What is in a slogan: “Overcome your anger if you are aman”
Taking this historical context into consideration, it becomes
even more important and urgent to analyze the recent
campaign against violence publicized with the slogans “Be a
man first” and “Overcome your anger if you are a man.” The
discourse surrounding the campaign stands in sharp contrast to
thepost-1980 feminist discoursewhich exposes and challenges
patriarchal relations of domination through establishing net-
works of women's solidarity and calling women to be vocal
about the structural patterns breeding male violence. This
campaign gives us a sharp and condensed snapshot of a
conservative perspective on male violence and how, contrary
to the feminist emphasis on women's agency and solidarity, it
reserves agency exclusively to heterosexualmen in the effort to
prevent male violence, in turn reinforcing a certain model of
hegemonic masculinity.
KADEM, the women's organization conducting the cam-
paign was established in 2013 and enjoys the support of the
incumbent conservative JDP government, aswell as the explicit
support of Turkey's president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.11 For
instance, in a November 2014 speech at a KADEM summit,
Erdoğan stated that “among other women's NGO's, KADEM is
exceptionally successful in terms of its discourse and alterna-
tive ideas.” This was the same speech in which Erdoğan argued
that men and women cannot be equal, for equality is against
“fıtrat,” the Islamic concept denoting natural disposition.12
The president of KADEM, Sare Aydın Yılmaz, seems to share
President Erdoğan's ideas on gender equality. In an opinion
piece, she wrote in the national daily newspaper Star she
suggests that the concept of “justice” is more in tune with the
needs of society in Turkey than the concept of “equality” (Aydin
Yılmaz, 2014). At the same time, she blames Turkey's women's
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distinctions among different strands of the movement, for
being stuck on the 19th-century concept of “equality.” Through
this argument, she is referring to the age-old equality vs.
difference debate, which had already been on the women's
movement's agenda for decades in Turkey (Arat, 1997). Besides
glossing over this information, she does not suggest engaging
in a discussion about what substantive gender equality would
entail. Instead, she argues that gender equality should not be a
goal and suggests giving weight to the concept of “justice,”
which, according to her, is superior to equality because it
acknowledges the fıtrat ofwomenand theneed to protect them
due to their fıtrat.
Discursive limits in arguments supporting the campaign
The KADEM campaign publicized under the slogan “Over-
come your anger if you are a man” rests within the broader
discursive context which aims to displace the concept of
gender equality in favor of the concept of “justice” based on the
assumption of natural born inequalities between men and
women. This section looks into themain lines of argumentation
employed in support of the campaign by conducting a content
analysis of documents published on KADEM's website; inter-
views with the president of KADEM in national daily newspa-
pers, and all the columns published between November and
January 2014 in national daily newspapers that lend support to
the campaign and its slogans. The websites of national daily
newspapers were scanned with the keywords “KADEM” and
“erkeksen” (if you are a man). The period between November
andDecember 2013was selected as the slogan “Overcome your
anger if you are a man” was launched in November 25, 2013,
followed by a series of newspaper columns promoting the
campaign. We focus on columns that support the campaign
because the purpose of the study is to delineate and analyze the
discursive ground within which the slogan rests, as well as to
point out the limits and paradoxes inherent in this ground.
We distinguish three salient lines of argumentation in the
data. The first line emphasizes an alleged “cultural particular-
ity” in Turkey, especially with regard to gender relations, and
the centrality of the family to this “cultural particularity.” The
second line of argumentation emphasizes that it is essential to
speak to and reconcile with men, in other words to act in a
consensual rather than a conflicting manner in the struggle to
end male violence. While inviting men to live up to the values
attributed to “the masculine,” the norms of hegemonic
masculinity are reinforced and glorified. In this line of
argumentation, feminist concepts such as “women's solidarity”
are portrayed as Western based, thus remaining marginal to
the social norms in Turkey. The last linesuggests that male
violence is an individual issue of “anger management,”
stripping the issue from its structural roots embedded in
relations of patriarchal power and domination.
Protecting the “cultural essence”: Protecting the family
KADEM's vision statement, declares that the organization is
devoted to “conserving the essential values of women in
Turkey,”13 implying that there are some predetermined,
natural, and “essential” values that are or should be upheld by
the society as a whole. In an interview with the national dailySabah newspaper,14 Sare Aydın Yılmaz argues that the feminist
literature belongs strictly to theWest and cannot be embraced
by non-Western societies, contending that “every culture has a
unique perspective when it comes to the woman issue.” She
further referencespostmodernism, as a global intellectual
challenge to the domination of Western feminism to provide
intellectual support to the position of upholding the “essential”
and “authentic” cultural traits vs. “Western-based feminism”
while promoting women's rights in Turkey.
In the same interviewwith Sabah, Yılmaz goes on to explain
the rationale behind using the slogan “Overcome your anger if
you are a man,” arguing that this is exactly the slogan that will
resonate with the particular cultural codes in Turkey:
Where does violence come from? Men. Who are the
targets? Men. Then whom should the slogan address? It
should address men. This slogan is ironic, yet it also
encourages our own cultural codes… This is actually a
challenge to men… Every culture has a perspective of its
own. If you use this slogan in Sweden, maybe it will not
have proper influence on society. You will make a better
impression and havemore of an impactwhen you conduct a
campaign in accordance with the cultural essence. (Sabah,
1.12.2013)
Here, besides emphasizing that there is an essential core to
the culture in Turkey, especially in terms of gender, she also
supports naturalizing and preserving that “cultural essence”
rather than even slightly questioning or challenging it.
Moreover, it is taken for granted that addressing men and
inviting them to abide by cultural codes that are allegedly “our
own,” rather than calling women to stand up against violence,
is much more resonant with Turkey's “cultural essence”.
The assumption of the “cultural essence” can also be traced
throughout the columnists’ support for KADEM and its
campaign against male violence. For instance, Hilal Kaplan, a
columnist for Yeni Şafak newspaper, which is also known for its
close ties with the JDP government, celebrates the organization
as follows:
KADEM is set to prove that the objectives of protecting
cultural values and protecting women are not conflicting
but rather complementary objectives. (Hilal Kaplan, Yeni
Şafak, 27.11.2013)
What is meant by the particular “cultural values” is made
clearer by Halime Kökçe, a columnist in Star newspaper:
Indeed, women are subjected to violence within their
families. But can we prevent this violence by looking down
on the family and praising alternative models of family?
This obviously is not the right track. When we define male
and female roles through a terminology that excludes
family, the patriarchal structure reacts in the opposite
way. Besides, the values of religion also necessitate a society
to which family is central. Therefore, if we are to elevate
women's status and give them equal rights with men, we
have to avoid a language that is in conflict with the values of
the society and religion, which strengthens those values.
KADEM will handle the woman issue without excluding
conservative values and without putting men in the
position of “the other.” (Halime Kökçe, Star, 28.11.2013)
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“religious” values, without feeling the need to acknowledge
which religion or which interpretation of Islam she is referring
to. She is not only assuming that each and every citizen
naturally subscribes to a religious belonging, she also assumes
that source of religious belonging to be Islam. Even more
problematic is the fact that she suggests appeasing “the
patriarchal structure” so that it will not “react in the opposite
way,” a reaction which, in this case, presumably means
inflicting more violence on women. It is suggested that the
only way to appease this “patriarchal structure”—and protect
women from even more angry husbands and fathers—is to
avoid pointing out, criticizing, questioning the violence em-
bedded in the family; an institution that should remain intact at
all costs.
Glorifying “honorable men,” degrading “nagging” women
The second line of argumentation that supports the KADEM
campaign and the slogan “Overcome your anger if you are a
man” manifests itself, first, through the glorification of values
attributed to the “masculine” and second, through denouncing
feminist discourse for being conflict based.
Hümeyra Şahin, a columnist for Akşam newspaper defends
the slogan as follows:
This slogan (overcome your anger if you are a man) is not a
conflict based call to a duel between men and women.
Instead of a conflict based feminist discourse, the slogan is a
call to men to come up to the task of being brave, being
honourable, positive traits that are attributed tomen by our
culture. (Hümeyra Şahin, Akşam, 26.11.2013)
There are two different points raised by this quotation. First,
the dichotomous gendered attributions are reinforced: the
norms of hegemonic masculinity supported by “our culture”
expectmen to be naturally brave andhonorable, and thosewho
inflict violence on women are deviating from this “natural
state” of being a man. Therefore, the solution to male violence
lies in calling men to live up to the naturalized positive traits
that are attributed to them. As there is no mention of the need
for strict legal enforcement, the suggested solution to male
violence boils down to asking men “nicely” to return to their
“natural” state, praising them for their supposedly inherent
attributes. Second, the columnist puts the blame on feminist
discourse for calling duels between men and women.
Hümeyra Şahin is not alone in her attitude of accusing
feminists for fanning the flame on male violence. When we
delve further into the arguments presented in support of the
campaign, it is clear that denouncing the language of women's
solidarity and blaming feminists for upholding this language, is
a common aspect. For instance, Elif Çakır, a columnist for the
Star newspaper, contends that “Overcome your anger if you are
a man” is a powerful slogan exactly because it speaks the
language of the masculine by talking about power, as opposed
to “nagging and whining” that she implicitly associates with
the “feminine”:
Women's associations in Turkey push women to an eternal
secondary position, to the position of “the other” by using
concepts like violence, protection, and solidarity. These
words, or demands for quotas (in elections) only causepeople to laugh up their sleeves.… This slogan calls on men
to be propermen through a language of power, potency and
authority, emphasizing manliness. Therefore it is as mascu-
line a slogan as it is provocative. It uses a humorous, witty,
masculine language, a language that men cannot laugh up
their sleeves, a language which women can use with a
smiling face while looking at men in the eye. I think it is
marvellous. It is not whiney, there is no frowning victim
discourse, there is no empty nagging. (Elif Çakır, Star,
1.12.2013)
The binary gendered oppositions reinforced in Çakır's
column are noteworthy. According to her, to speak a language
of power, potency, and authority means to speak the language
of the masculine. Emphasizing power, potency, and authority
means emphasizing virility, for these concepts are taken to
belong to the realm of the masculine. Unless one speaks the
language of the masculine, one is nagging and whining. Çakır's
argumentation is puzzling, to say the least, as she first blames
all women's associations (other than KADEM) for pushing
women to a secondary position before condemning every
utterance, every struggle that remains outside the “masculine
language” for not being masculine enough. According to the
columnist, uttering the possibility of women's solidarity leads
to confiningwomen to the position of “the other,” themarginal,
which is a position for nagging and whining women. The
columnist suggests that this language is not to be taken
seriously as it is to be mocked by men. Ironically, speaking the
language of the masculine, and steering clear of concepts that
suggest an active struggle and solidarity bywomen themselves
figure as the fundamental standards by which to judge the
success of a campaign against male violence. Accordingly,
womenwho survivemale violence are the very group of people
whoare to be excluded from the struggle againstmale violence.
They are to be precluded from publicly “shouting out,” for that
kind of attitude would mean “empty nagging,” placing them in
the realm of the feminine as opposed to the masculine, thus
marginalizing them in the eyes of men.
Violence as an individual problem of “anger management”
The third line of argumentation that supports the KADEM
campaign formulates the problem of violence against women
as an individual problem of “anger management,” isolating the
issue from the context of patriarchal relations of power and
domination.
KADEM, by using the slogan “Overcome your anger if you
are aman”hits the violence problem in the eye because it all
starts in the inner world. Failure to control anger leads to
violence. A small burst of violence spreads to society.…We
know that anger is an emotional reaction to unwanted
situations. Humans are humans because they are capable of
controlling emotions. (Hümeyra Şahin, Akşam, 26.11.2013)
In this quotation, when the columnist argues that the
problem starts at the individual level and then spreads to the
society, she locates the problem at the individual level,
overlooking its relation with gendered social norms and
relations of power that breed violence. This line of argumen-
tation complies conveniently with a conservative agenda on
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questioning the traditional family structure. The rhetoric of
individualization of violence also legitimizes the difficult
position of rendering women devoid of agency in the fight
against violence: When solutions are sought in the personal
ability tomanage one's anger, it appears almost natural to hand
all agency to men. As Seymour puts aptly, when violence
against women is reduced to a problem of anger management,
“women's safety is extricably linked to men, and, in particular,
to men's willingness to control, protect and defend” (2011: 5).
Putting the emphasis on the individual and his ability to
manage himself also hints at the neoliberal discourse of
“management of the self” which shifts responsibility of
problems “from society to the individual, thus leaving social
structural problems largely intact” (Chen, 2010: 258). It has
been argued that neo-liberal and neo-conservative agendas
have been feeding one another in the last decade in Turkey,
especially with regard to the “politics of intimate” (Acar &
Altunok, 2013). When it comes to the issue of violence against
women, the rhetoric of “violence as an individual problem” lies
at the intersection of neoliberal and conservative rationalities,
for it both shifts responsibility to the individual and legitimizes
the attitude of avoiding, if not totally abandoning, a discussion
on substantial gender equality.
Discussion
One might indeed question whether it is wrong to address
men and take them as interlocutors in the effort to prevent
male violence. Not necessarily15. But the ways in which men
are to be addressed makes all the difference. The problemwith
the campaign slogans “Overcome your anger if you are a man”
and “Be a man first” is not that they address men. The problem
is that the slogans and the campaign are invested in reinforcing
and ossifying dominant norms of hegemonic masculinity as
well asmale domination, as if these play no part in the constant
reproduction of violence againstwomen.We argue that it is not
possible to fight against male violence without opening a
critical discussion about the connotations of “being a man” in
Turkey, and the ways in which these connotations legitimize
men's privilege to establish control over women.
In an article dealing with the question of whether engaging
in violence against women is in any way relatable to dominant
codes of hegemonic masculinity, Connell states the following:
I agree that in the public realm men who batter wives /
partners are not cultural heroes. However . . . In the informal
culture of neighbourhoods, workplaces and pubs, husbands
have been expected to keep wives in their place, and a man
who can’t do this has been regarded by other men with a
degree of contempt. A controlled use of force, or the threat
of force, has been widely accepted as part of men's
repertoire in dealing with women and children as well as
with other men.… Research with batterers and rapists
indeed detects remorse and shame, (as Jefferson states) but
also detects feelings of entitlement, justifications and the
intention to establish control (2002: 93–94).
Obviously, when the supporters of the KADEM campaign
suggest that the cure to male violence lies in calling men to “be
men,” they are assuming that the problem of violence againstwomen, which is so vehemently widespread in Turkey, has no
relation to the attribution of power, potency, and authority to
men. Moreover, the three lines of argumentation in support of
the campaign are bound by the assumption that one should
avoid questioning and challenging the relations of power and
domination which grant men the privilege and the “duty” to
establish control over their partners, wives, children, as well as
their own anger. Accordingly, a feminist questioning of male
dominance results inmen “laughingup their sleeves” at best, and
provokes men to be more violent at worst. Hence, the need to
appease men and resort to men's supposedly “inborn” ability to
control and manage their anger while preventing women from
engaging in an active political struggle againstmale violence. The
obvious paradoxes and weaknesses in these assumptions and
arguments are covered up by ambiguous and unsubstantiated
references to a “cultural essence” in Turkey which supposedly
requires avoiding a critical discussion on the patriarchal relations
of power pervading social, political, and intimate realms.
Conclusion
The slogan “Overcome your anger if you are a man” was
revealed as a part of KADEM's campaign against violence against
women in 2013, aiming to raise awareness about increasing
male violence damaging women's physical, sexual, and social
integrity. This paper critically analyzes KADEM's campaign and
its slogan through a perspective that emphasizes the relation
between gendered power hierarchy and male violence. We
employ the concept of hegemonic masculinity as it enables us to
trace the relational multiple constructions of masculinities and
femininities by remaining sensitive to the historical context. We
discuss the discursive ground of the KADEM campaign with
regard to the boundaries of an “institutionalized” system of the
normative gender order in Turkey. However, while doing so, we
look into the post-1980women'smovement and thepossibilities
it suggests in terms of subverting that normative gender order.
An analysis of the discourse surrounding the KADEM campaign
demonstrates how those possibilities are labeled as “marginal,”
and the tensions revolving around the very political act of
critically engaging with what it means to be a man in Turkey.
Based on an analysis of the discursive ground of the
campaign within which the slogan rests, three significant
lines of argumentation were delineated. First, the campaign is
publicized and promoted as an effort in accordance with the
“cultural essence” in Turkey. In the framework of a delicate
issue such as violence that transcends cultures and repeats
itself, this argument hints at the idea of naturalizing traditional
gender hierarchy within the society. The second line of
argumentation is perilous as the campaign not only glorifies
hegemonic masculine norms but also ostracizes a feminist
agenda on violence as being Western or not a la Turca, i.e.,
Turkish. The final line of argumentation that this paper
juxtaposes is about the problematic stripping of the issue of
violence from its sexist and misogynist roots by taking it as a
problem of anger management at individual level.
The urge to analyze the campaign is twofold for us. First, in
Turkish political arena where masculinist norms have been
reproduced not only at institutional but also discursive level,
addressing man as the sole interlocutor masks the risk of
disregarding woman's political agency. Additionally, in a
parallel way, an analytical lens compatible with the post-1980
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while the discursive ground surrounding the campaign stands
in contrast. We argue that a fight against violence should first
challenge gender inequalities based on hierarchical power
relations undergirding violence or any other form of control
and/or domination.
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Endnotes
1 See KADEM (Women and Democracy Association) http://kadem.org.tr/
vizyonumuz/ last accessed on March 8, 2015.
2 See World Health Organization Media Centre http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/factsheets/fs239/en/ last accessed on April, 20, 2016.
3 See Bianet http://www.bianet.org/english/women/161679-male-
violence-2014-infographic last accessed on February 20, 2015.
4 The title of the Law 6248 is “The Law to Protect Family and Prevent
Violence AgainstWomen”. This title has been criticized for locating “the family”
over the individual, and for reflecting the assumption that women are
necessarily a part of family rather than individuals. (Şener, 2012).
5 See KADEM (Kadın ve Demokrasi Derneği) http://kadem.org.tr/the-
women-and-democracy-association-kadem/ last accessed on March 6, 2015
6 See KADEM (Kadın ve Demokrasi Derneği) http://kadem.org.tr/the-
women-and-democracy-association-kadem/ last accessed on March 6, 2015.
7 For a detailed analysis ofmasculinity studies, feminism and their relations
with reference to their engagement with male violence see McCarry, 2007.
8 ‘Finding one’s own voice’ is a tellingmetaphor forfindingways to express
subjugated experiences. In a documentary about the post-1980 feminist
movement, Gülnur Savran, a feminist academic and a movement activist talks
about the difficulties she had in terms of ‘speaking out’ in the male dominated
socialist gatherings in the 1970’s. She explains that her ‘voice’ (literally) came
out like a teenager boy’s voice, shaky and insecure, also denoting her insecurity
in terms of speaking her mind under the disapproving male gazes. (Özman,
Melek (Director) (2008) İsyan-I Nisvan (Women’s Rebellion) [Documentary]
Turkey: Filmmor Women’s Cooperative. )
9 See Mor (Purple) http://mor.blogcu.com/bagir-herkes-duysun/184782-.
last accessed on March 5, 2015.
10 For a detailed account of the history of violence against women in
Turkey, and especially for the contribution of KAMER (KadınMerkeziWomen’s
Center) established in 1997, see Altınay & Arat, 2008.
11 President Erdoğan’s daughter, SümeyyeErdoğan is among the members
of the Board of Directors of KADEM.
12 “Kadın ile erkeği eşit konumagetiremezsiniz çünkü o fıtrata terstir” (You
cannot make men and women equal because it is against the fıtrat), Milliyet,
24.11.2014, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/erdogan-batsin-bu-dunya/siyaset/
detay/1974189/default.htm. last accessed on December 29, 2014.
13 http://kadem.org.tr/vizyonumuz/ last accessed on December 29, 2014.
14 “Erkeksen öfkeni yen diyerekironiyaptık”, Sabah, 1.12.2013.http://www.
sabah.com.tr/pazar/2013/12/01/erkeksen-ofkeni-yen-diyerek-ironi-yaptik last
accessed on December 29, 2014.
15 For instance, there are recent efforts in Turkey initiated by men to fight
against male violence, such as Rahatsız Erkekler (Uncomfortable Men) and
Ataerkiye Karşı Erkekler (Men against Patriarchy). These activist groups are
significant not only because they mobilize men to fight against male violence
but also because they encourage the questioning of masculinist norms, sexism
and gender violence by men themselves.
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